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We analyze sector specific shocks in productivity and demand in 19 manufacturing sectors of the 
Austrian economy. Based on a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model with long run 
restrictions developed by Gal\'i (1999) we extract technology and non-technology shocks from 
sectoral andaggregate data and study their patterns  and relationship by means of a principal 
components analysis. We find a close association of sectoral and macroeconomic non-technology 
shocks but only a very weak association for technology shocks. Impulse-response analysis 
indicates that for almost all manufacturing sectors and the Austrian economy productivity growth 
rates experience an immediate increase to positive technology shocks while the hours worked 
decline. We therefore confirm Gal\'i's results on the level of manufacturing industries. Finally, we 
use the identified shocks as explanatory variables in fixed effect regressions on growth rates of 
employment, output and investment. We find that our shocks are closely associated to employment 
growth and output growth but not to growth in investment. The effect of technology shocks is 
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Abstract
We analyze sector speciﬁc shocks in productivity and demand in 19 man-
ufacturing sectors of the Austrian economy. Based on a structural vector
autoregressive (SVAR) model with long run restrictions developed by Gal´ ı
(1999) we extract technology and non-technology shocks from sectoral and
aggregate data and study their patterns and relationship by means of a
principal components analysis. We ﬁnd a close association of sectoral and
macroeconomic non-technology shocks but only a very weak association for
technology shocks. Impulse-response analysis indicates that for almost all
manufacturing sectors and the Austrian economy productivity growth rates
experience an immediate increase to positive technology shocks while the
hours worked decline. We therefore conﬁrm Gal´ ı’s results on the level of
manufacturing industries. Finally, we use the identiﬁed shocks as explana-
tory variables in ﬁxed eﬀect regressions on growth rates of employment,
output and investment. We ﬁnd that our shocks are closely associated to
employment growth and output growth but not to growth in investment.
The eﬀect of technology shocks is diﬀerent on the level of manufacturing
industries and the aggregate economy.
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11 Introduction
The question how business cycles relate to growth and changes in employ-
ment is controversial in economics. The view that the same impulses that
drive economic growth lead also to business cycles was suggested by Schum-
peter [27] and was taken up and developed by real business cycle theorists
in the framework of neoclassical growth theory (see for instance Kydland
and Prescott [20], Long and Plosser [21]). These models usually predict a
positive co-movement between employment and technology shocks, so that
ﬂuctuations in employment and output are seen as a phenomenon driven by
real shocks.
In recent times the relationship between technology shocks and employ-
ment growth has come under new scrutiny after the contribution of Gal´ ı [12].
He devised an empirical approach based on a SVAR model with long run
restrictions to investigate the relation between (log) employment and (log)
labor productivity. He showed that the basic prediction of the real business
cycle (RBC) model of a positive correlation between productivity or tech-
nology shocks and employment growth is not observed empirically for the
US. The second important ﬁnding was that non-technology shocks closely
match the business cycle patterns in the US economy. Accordingly non-
technology shocks may be considered the source of business cycles. These
results were conﬁrmed by other authors (e.g. Shea [28], Basu et al [4] Fran-
cis and Ramey [11] or Gal´ ı [13]). They are in line with predictions from
New Keynesian theory that holds that business cycles are driven by nominal
disturbances such as Gal´ ı’s non-technology shocks. The responses to these
shocks are determined by market imperfections and other factors inhibiting
an immediate adjustment of economic agents to the perceived shocks (see
Goodfriend and King [14]).
Overall Gal´ ı’s empirical model is consistent with a broad class of the-
oretical models such as New Keynesian ones with sticky prices as well as
dynamic general equilibrium models with habit formation or limited substi-
tution possibilities between capital and labor. Gal´ ı for instance shows that
the negative co-movement between hours and technology may be observed
if ﬁrms set their prices before technology shocks arrive. In the short run
ﬁrms will reduce hours while consumption will not increase. Francis and
Ramey [11] present two dynamic general equilibrium models without price
or wage rigidities that share the same prediction. They show that models
based on habit formation in consumption and adjustment costs on invest-
ment and models with a Leontieﬀ technology and labor saving technology
shocks provide explanations for a negative response of hours to technology
shocks.
All the listed empirical as well as theoretical studies investigate tech-
2nology and non-technology shocks from a macroeconomic perspective.
1 The
aggregated perspective neglects the fact that shocks are absorbed at a disag-
gregated level. Industry speciﬁc factors may induce quite diﬀerent responses
across industries, so that insights gained from aggregate analysis may not
be taken for granted for sectors in an economy. Harberger [18] for instance
illustrates in his seminal paper that growth is unbalanced. He showed that
diﬀerent economic sectors experience very diﬀerent shocks to total factor
productivity which give rise to heterogeneous patterns of sectoral growth.
Therefore it is interesting to study whether the macroeconomic results of
Gal´ ı hold at the industry level and how industry speciﬁc shocks are related
to macroeconomic ones. This is the ﬁrst aim of this paper. The second aim
is to study the association of technology and non-technology shocks with
important indicators for economic growth such as employment growth, out-
put growth and investment growth. We believe this to be a more indicative
strategy in order to uncover the relationships between growth and cycles in
as it helps to dissect the relationship between responses to shocks at the
disaggregated and the macroeconomic level. Our disaggregated perspective
will focus on manufacturing industries.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the em-
pirical model used to identify the technology and non-technology shocks.
Section three presents the data. The results are presented in section 4.
We present ﬁrst evidence regarding the relationship between sectoral and
macroeconomic shocks. Then we investigate the eﬀect of the shocks on the
growth rates of employment, production and investment both on the sectoral
and the macroeconomic level. Concluding remarks close the paper.
2 Identifying technology and demand shocks
with structural VARs: the empirical model
Our approach to extract genuine technology and non-technology shocks
from aggregate sectoral data follows the identiﬁcation strategy proposed by
Gal´ ı [12]. It draws on a SVAR model with long run restrictions originally
introduced by Blanchard and Quah [5]. This method has two advantages:
1. Two kinds of shocks are extracted as opposed to TFP analysis. This
allows to consider two kinds of impulse mechanisms, the real business
cycle mechanism starting from stochastic ﬂuctuations in productivity
and a second mechanism based on non-technology shocks. It is often
argued that additional shocks are essential to capture the business
cycle phenomenon (Stadler [29]).
1Exception are the studies by Basu et al. [4] and Burnside et al. [6], who use sectoral
Solow residuals to study aggregate productivity growth.
32. This method enables us to circumnavigate the problems of interpre-
tation of total factor productivity (Felipe and Fisher [10], Carlaw and
Lipsey [7]). Total factor productivity (TFP) is usually used in the
calibration exercises of RBC-theorists. TFP is derived as residual in
growth accounting and has more than one interpretation. The most
popular is that TFP measures technological change (e.g. Barro [3] or
Prescott [26]), others interpret it as free lunch (e.g. Jorgenson and
Griliches [19]), while the most daunting is the interpretation of TFP
as measure of ignorance and measurement error (e.g. Griliches [15]).
This suggests, that it is an advantage that the technology shocks we
estimate are not based on Solow residuals.
The key assumptions entertained by Gal´ ı are that capital labor ratios
and eﬀort per hour determining labor input follow stationary stochastic pro-
cesses, whereas the technology shock is assumed to have a unit root. Only
technology shocks can have a permanent eﬀect on the level of labor produc-
tivity. We apply this identiﬁcation strategy to sectoral series of productivity
and hours for Austrian manufacturing. The logs of productivity ˆ li,t and of
worked hours ˆ hi,t on the sectoral level can be represented as a VMA(∞) pro-
cess determined by technology and non-technology shocks. Assuming that
sectoral time series are integrated of order one, it is necessary to use ﬁrst
diﬀerences to achieve stationarity. Accordingly, for each industrial sector i
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are the vectors of technology




is the long run multiplier matrix of these shocks, ∆ˆ li,t and ∆ˆ hi,t are the ﬁrst
diﬀerences of the logs of productivity and hours. The technology and non-
technology shocks are assumed to be orthogonal, and to have unit variance,
E[σi,tσ
0
i,t] = I. As every VMA process has a VAR representation, they can
be extracted from the residuals ei,t of
ˆ yi,t = Ψˆ yi,t−1 + ei,t
which is a VAR(1) process. For this purpose we must ﬁnd the Φi,0, so that
Φ
−1
i,0ei,t = σi,t, (2)
transforms the reduced form shocks of the VAR(1) into the genuine shocks
of the VMA(∞) process, as shown by Blanchard and Quah [5, p.657] or
Hamilton [17, p.324ﬀ.]. The Choleski decomposition underlying the trans-
formation of VAR(1) residuals into VMA(∞) shocks requires a restriction
to be imposed on the matrix of long run multipliers. We assume that
4P∞
`=0 Φi,`(1,2) = 0. This is equivalent to say that the assumed unit root
in the productivity growth series is not inﬂuenced permanently by non-
technology shocks. Francis and Ramey [11] show that this identiﬁcation
scheme performs very well in extracting genuine technology shocks from the
data. Hall-Evans tests carried out on our shocks (reported below) support
this view also for the sectoral context.
A recent debate has questioned Gal´ ı’s identiﬁcation scheme. Uhlig [30]
for instance argues that other shocks such as changes in income capital tax-
ation may inﬂuence labor productivity in the long run. Christiano, Eichen-
baum and Vigfusson [8] question whether hours worked should enter the
SVAR model in ﬁrst diﬀerences. For US data there is no clear evidence of
an unit root in employment. In this case - so their argument - using hours in
ﬁrst diﬀerences is likely to distort the estimated response of hours to technol-
ogy shocks. Gal´ ı [13] counters this criticism by showing with US data that
innovations to the capital income tax rate are uncorrelated with his technol-
ogy shocks. Furthermore, while acknowledging that US employment data
may not be characterized by an unit root, he shows that for employment
data for Euro area this is not the case. Therefore hours should enter the
SVAR in ﬁrst diﬀerences for the Euro area. Gal´ ı’s ﬁndings are conﬁrmed by
unit root tests carried out on the Austrian macroeconomic series for hours
worked and productivity.
3 The data
The data are yearly data for Austrian manufacturing and cover the period
1971-1995. Due to changes in industry classiﬁcation comparable data is
not available for later years. The labor productivity series is from the ISIS
database of Statistics Austria. The labor productivity is an index of real
production per hour worked. The index of worked hours are derived from
the labor productivity and the real production value also taken from the
ISIS database (Appendix A.1 provides the details of the derivation of the
series). Sectoral employment, gross production and investment data were
all taken from the Industrial Statistics of Statistics Austria. Hours worked
at the aggregate level were obtained from Biﬄ [2]. The GDP deﬂator, gov-
ernment expenditures and quasi money were taken from the International
Financial Statistics (IMF). Real GDP and real investment in machinery at
the aggregate level were taken from the WIFO database.
4 Results
We estimated a VAR(1) for each sector i and extracted the technology and
non-technology shocks from its residuals. The modulus of the VAR(1) matrix
Ψi was less than 1 for each of the VARs estimated indicating that they
5were stable and covariance stationary, so that the assumption of a VMA(∞)
representation is vindicated. The series of (log) productivity and (log) hours
for each sector where tested for unit roots. ADF tests (including a trend
with a SIC based lag selection) did not reject the null of a unit root in the
levels for the productivity series, but did reject it when applied to the ﬁrst
diﬀerences. In a few cases where results were ambiguous further DF-GLS
tests conﬁrmed the diﬀerence stationarity of the series. We proceeded in
a similar way for the hours series, which were also all diﬀerence stationary
with exception of two industries (ID 16 and 17). In a similar way we tested
the macro series of labour productivity and hours for a unit root and found
that both were ﬁrst-diﬀerence stationary.
2
4.1 Technology and non-technology shocks at the
aggregate and the sectoral level
Impulse responses Figures 1 and 2 show the estimated impulse-
responses of the logs in productivity and hours to a one standard deviation
innovation for the whole economy and for one representative industry (iron
and metal products). The conﬁdence levels were obtained by bootstrapping
(see Amisano and Giannini [1, chapter 5.3]). The impulse response patterns
are similar for most other industries.
3 In the Austrian economy and most
sectors the productivity growth rate experiences an immediate increase in
response to a positive technology shock (upper left quadrant in the ﬁgures),
while the hours growth rate decreases for almost all sectors (upper right
quadrant). By deﬁnition non-technology shocks do not have an impact on
productivity (lower left quadrant), while non-technology shocks have in all
cases a permanent eﬀect on hours worked (lower right quadrant). Technol-
ogy shocks have a negative impact on hours, which reduces the base for
employment in the diﬀerent sectors. The impulse responses for aggregate
data show a weak negative eﬀect of technology shocks on hours worked. The
two sectors where hours respond to a technology shock as RBC theory would
postulate are foundries (14) and machinery & steel constructions (16), with
the eﬀect being larger for the latter. The impulse response functions for
one of these industries is shown in ﬁgure 3. A possible explanation is that
demand in these sectors is highly price elastic and competition international,
so that productivity gains which translate into lower prices attract foreign
demand, which in turn leads to an increase in employment. This is not im-
plausible for these export oriented sectors. What is also apparent is that
some declining sectors such as the mining or the leather producing sectors
and processing industries such as the petroleum industry, basic metal prod-
2VAR and unit root statistics are not reported here. Tables can be obtained from the
authors.
3All impulse-response ﬁgures are available upon request.
6ucts, stone and ceramic or glass and glass product manufacturing respond
with a stronger reduction in hours to technology shocks.
The responses of log productivity to non-technology shocks are zero out
of the restriction imposed in the structural VAR. Positive non-technology
innovations have a positive and lasting impact on the growth of hours worked
in each sector. The responses are slightly more accentuated for most of the
industries which display stronger response to technology shocks.
(Figures 1,2 and 3 about here)
Hall-Evans tests Hall [16] and Evans [9] claim that technology shocks
as computed by growth accounting are correlated with other exogenous
shocks that are not related to technology. We examine whether the technol-
ogy and non-technology shocks that we derived pass their tests. We consider
innovations in the inﬂation, money supply and government spending as ex-
ogenous disturbances. As we use yearly data, two kinds of tests are used:
The ﬁrst looks whether there is a contemporaneous correlation between our
shocks and other exogenous inﬂuences. We use an F-test to look whether
there is a strong correlation. The second test checks whether our shocks
are Granger-caused by the exogenous disturbances. In order to do this, we
regress technology (non-technology shocks) on a constant and two lags of
each of log per capita government spending, log GDP deﬂator and log per
capita nominal money. We use an F-test whether these variables Granger-
cause the technology and the demand shock.
(Table 1 about here)
Table 1 reports the tests for each of the industries. MS indicates the
macro shocks. A correlation between exogenous disturbances and technol-
ogy shocks is rejected for all manufacturing industries and the economy as a
whole. Causality cannot be rejected for clothing (20). That means that we
cannot reject the hypothesis that the shocks indeed are technology shocks.
The non-technology shocks show also a weak contemporaneous correlation
with the exogenous disturbances. However, the causality test shows that the
non-technology shocks are ’caused’ to a larger extent by exogenous distur-
bances, as we ﬁnd that Granger-causality cannot be rejected for 6 industries
at the 10 percent level. This suggests that we were able to identify genuine
technology shocks.
74.2 Principal components in technology and non-
technology shocks
Principal components analysis (PCA) is a multivariate statistic technique
which transforms a set of k indicators on l statistical units into a reduced
set of variables explaining a signiﬁcant proportion of the variability of the
original set of data. The components obtained trough PCA are uncorre-
lated, linear combinations of the original variables with unit variance. This
procedure is equivalent to an extraction of eigenvectors from the correlation
matrix of the data, where the eigenvectors with the largest eigenvalues also
explain the largest part of the observed variance in the data.
It is our purpose here to ﬁnd out how the identiﬁed technology shocks
in each industry contribute to the total observed variance throughout all
industrial sectors, or vice versa, which shocks are best explained by which
components. For this purpose we have calculated the squared correlation
between each component and a sectoral shock indicating the proportion of
variation in data series σki, k = s,d explained by component cj. This
measure is of particular interest, as it allows a componentwise explanation
of the shocks.
Technology shocks The results for the PCA on technology shocks
are summarized in table (2). It is evident that the heterogeneity in the data
is very high. The ﬁrst principal component accounts for only 21,69% of the
total variance across industries. Manufacturing industries do not appear to
synchronize in technological development. The results give evidence for a hy-
pothesis of diﬀerential potential for innovation which leads to an unbalanced
development in productivity (see also Harberger [18] and Pasinetti [24]). For
thirteen out of nineteen industries the ﬁrst component is among the com-
ponents explaining the largest part in their variance ranging from eighteen
to sixty percent. Even though this component explains a large part of the
variance in most industries it does not explain any variance in the observed
macroeconomic technology shock. This suggests, that aggregate productiv-
ity shocks are not associated with the most important component aﬀecting
the productivity development in almost all manufacturing sectors. However,
closer inspection shows that components c2 and c3 do account for some ma-
jor part in variance in the macro shock and together they explain about
25% of the variance in technology shocks across all industries. Analysis of
sectoral growth rates revealed that these components can be interpreted as
the contrast between expanding and declining industries. The association of
macroeconomic technology shocks with with sectoral developments in man-
ufacturing is weak. This suggests that that technological development is to
a large extent sector speciﬁc (see also Malerba [23]). The evidence suggests
that macroeconomic developments in labor productivity are more closely re-
8lated to the non-manufacturing sectors in the Austrian economy than to the
developments in the manufacturing industries.
Non-technology shocks The results for the PCA on non-technology
(demand) shocks are displayed in table 3. They are quite diﬀerent from
the evidence on technology shocks. Almost all industries (except mining,
petroleum and leather processing) share one principal component c1, which
accounts for 45.16% of the total variance across industries and for thirty
to eighty percent of the industry variances. Furthermore, this component
explains a large part of the variance in the macroeconomic non-technology
shocks. This is a strong indication that sectoral non-technology shocks are
correlated to their macroeconomic couterpart. This is the main diﬀerence
from the PCA analysis of technology shocks, where we found much more
heterogeneity. General macroeconomic non-technology shocks seem to af-
fects all sectors, while there are still industry speciﬁc eﬀects of expansion
and decline. This is a possible interpretation for components c2, c3, and c4.
Component c2 seems to reﬂect a contrasting development between interme-
diate industries (related to basic good production) and the consumer goods
sector on the one hand and more competitive intermediate good industries
and the capital good sector on other hand. Most other components seem to
be either idiosyncratic to some groups of industries (e.g. c6 to basic goods
sector) or to single industries.
(Table 2 and 3 about here)
Long and Plosser [22] carried out a similar exercise with monthly US
data. They found that a common aggregate disturbance in output had sig-
niﬁcant explanatory power for industrial outputs, but that its inﬂuence was
very modest. The shocks identiﬁed by Long and Plosser were the residuals
of a VAR model with (logs) of monthly output growth and seasonal means
across industries. Even though one should be careful to compare Long and
Plosser’s analysis with ours, our results suggest that Long and Plosser’s resid-
uals were not genuine technology shocks. The VAR residuals they use for
their analysis are likely to be combinations of diﬀerent shocks. This might
be the reason why their sectoral output shocks share one large component. If
their residuals contain technology and non-technology shocks, then the lat-
ter might be the cause for their ﬁnding. The shocks derived with the SVAR
approach are more parsimonious and allow to distinguish between two dif-
ferent types of shocks. Our results suggest that business cycles in Austrian
manufacturing are not driven by aggregate technology shocks. They can
also be interpreted as evidence against the validity of RBC arguments for
9Austria, as RBC models require large symmetric shocks (Stadler [29]). The
heterogeneity of technology shocks suggests that if there are large symmetric
shocks they are likely to be demand shocks.
4.3 The eﬀect of technology and non-technology
shocks on economic growth
The analysis in the previous section analyzed the link between aggregate
and sectoral shocks in technology and demand. In this section we look at
the impact of these shocks on growth by studying employment, output, and
investment growth both at the sectoral and at the macroeconomic level. We
study whether the inﬂuence of the shocks is homogenous across industries
and the relationship between manufacturing and the aggregate economy. For
this purpose we use ﬁxed eﬀect regressions which allow for industry speciﬁc
intercepts at the sectoral level. At the macroeconomic level we use OLS. In
order to check for possible heterogeneity at the industry level we report our
results for broader industry groupings.
The impact on employment growth From the discussion of
impulse-responses it should be clear that we expect a negative correlation
between technology shocks and employment growth and a positive correla-
tion between non-technology shocks and employment growth.
(Table 4 about here)
Table 4 displays the regression results for the manufacturing industries.
We ﬁnd a negative relationship between technology shocks and employment
growth and a positive relationship between non-technology shocks and em-
ployment growth. Also, the lagged demand shocks and technology shocks
show the expected sign, although they are not statistically signiﬁcant. The
r
2 is high, that means industry-speciﬁc technology and demand shocks are
important determinants of employment dynamics at the level of manufactur-
ing industries. These regressions therefore summarize our impulse response
analysis. This result conﬁrms the impulse-response analysis. The separate
regressions for the capital goods, intermediate goods and consumer goods
sectors in table 4 conﬁrm that there is a nearly uniform response in terms
of employment to technology and non-technology shocks. We conclude that
employment dynamics in the manufacturing industries are guided to a large
extent by technology and demand shocks. Technology shocks reduce and
non-technology shocks increase hours worked.
At the macroeconomic level we ﬁnd no negative relationship between
total employment growth and technology shocks. The regression results
10in column 2 in table 5 show there is a positive, although not statistically
signiﬁcant, contemporaneous association. The non-technology shocks are
correlated contemporaneously with employment growth. Overall the shocks
explain less variation at the macroeconomic level than at the level of manu-
facturing industries.
(Table 5 about here)
The impact on output growth. Let us now consider the growth
of production. True demand shocks should be correlated with the growth
rate of production. Technology shocks may or may not inﬂuence the growth
of production value. Taking into account the models considered by Gal´ ı [12]
and Francis and Ramey [11] a technology shock should lead to a delayed
response of output. As the delay should be diﬀerent across the industries
we expect that technology shocks are less correlated with the growth rate of
the gross production value than non-technology shocks.
(Table 6 about here)
Table 6 presents the regression results for output growth at the industry
level. Table 5 reports in column 3 the results for the aggregate economy.
We used the gross production value at the industry level and GDP at the
aggregate level as this is consistent with the theory of production (Basu et
al [4]). Non-technology shocks are as expected uniformly positive and highly
correlated with the growth rate of production. Interestingly, the correlation
between demand shocks and the growth rate of the gross production value is
highest for the capital goods industries but very strong also for the interme-
diate and the consumer goods industries. Technology shocks show a more
diﬀerentiated picture. The correlation is signiﬁcant and positive for capital
goods industries, but signiﬁcant and negative for the intermediate goods in-
dustries. The negative coeﬃcient is puzzling but most likely associated with
the negative eﬀect of technology shocks on employment. For consumer goods
industries technology shocks seem not to be associated with the growth rate
of production. Technology shocks lead to heterogeneous responses across the
industries. Overall, the regression suggests that the non-technology shocks
we identiﬁed are demand shocks.
At the macroeconomic level we ﬁnd a very strong relationship of GDP
growth with both technology and demand shocks. In terms of r
2 the shocks
we identiﬁed are able to explain a large part of GDP growth. Again as for
11employment growth, we observe a diﬀerent association of technology shocks
with output growth at the macroeconomic level, the association is similar
as in the capital goods industries. The positive lagged eﬀect of technol-
ogy shocks and the negative lagged eﬀect of non-technology shocks shows
again the diﬀerence between the behavior of the aggregate economy and the
manufacturing sector.
The impact on investment growth. The association between
investment growth and technology shocks is highly interesting. On the one
hand, one can think of technology shocks causing higher investment through
their eﬀect on the long run value of the ﬁrm, but on the other hand the
causation which runs from technology shocks to investment via a vintage
eﬀect is equally plausible. These are two conﬂicting hypotheses, that can be
tested empirically. We use investment into machinery as the indicator for
investment growth, as investment in structures and vehicles are less to be
associated with technology shocks, at least in the manufacturing sector.
Table 7 presents the regression results for the growth rate of investment
at the level of manufacturing industries. The explanatory power in terms
of r
2 is much lower than for employment and output growth. There is a
statistically signiﬁcant negative association of investment growth with tech-
nology shocks, which is driven by the consumer goods sector and the capital
goods sector. A speculative interpretation of this surprising result is that
productivity advances are generated primarily by capital goods that are also
increasing capital productivity. This needs to be tested more rigorously.
The positive association of non-technology shocks is less surprising. If the
non-technology shocks are interpreted as demand shocks, this result suggests
that higher demand leads to capacity expansions. However, bear in mind
that demand shocks and technology shocks do explain very little of the ob-
served investment growth. Column 4 in table 5 reports the results for the
aggregate economy. No coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant. However, again we observe
no negative eﬀect of technology shocks on investment growth.
(Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10 about here)
Let us now consider the other direction of causality. Table 8 reports tests
of the causality running from investment to non-technology shocks and table
9 for the causality from investment growth to technology shocks. For both
we observe a strong contemporaneous association which is in line with the
ﬁndings before. A contemporaneous negative eﬀect between investment and
technology shocks can be explained on the basis of adjustment costs. For
the consumer goods sector we ﬁnd that lagged investments leads to negative
technology shocks. However in terms of explained variation the ﬁndings are
12again very weak. A similar picture is present on the macroeconomic level as
table 10 shows. No coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant and we observe again a positive
relationship between technology shocks and investment growth, however the
r
2’s are extremely modest. We conclude that there is only a very weak
relationship between investment growth and technology shocks both on the
aggregate level and on the level of manufacturing industries.
5 Discussion and conclusion
We ﬁnd that Gal´ ı’s results on the impact of technology and non-technology
shocks on hours worked and labor productivity are well supported by the
Austrian data at the aggregate and the sectoral level. The identiﬁed sec-
toral technology shocks are shown to be genuine in so far as they do not to
correlate with other exogenous macroeconomic disturbances. The impulse-
response analysis for each sector shows that hours worked permanently and
negatively responds to positive technology shocks, while positive demand
shocks positively aﬀect the growth of employment in each sector. These
ﬁndings are robust across industries and are at odds with the Real Business
Cycle literature, which postulates a positive co-movement between technol-
ogy shocks and employment. Also the aggregate evidence leads support
to New Keynesian theories that emphasize adjustment delays due to prices
rigidities, technological complementarities (say if the assumption of Leontief
technologies is valid in the short run) or consumer habits.
Principal components analysis was used to identify common components
in variance of extracted shocks. The analysis delivered a number of interest-
ing results, that strengthen the results from the IR analysis:
1. The results support the idea that business cycles are not driven by
technology shocks in the manufacturing sectors.
2. Heterogeneity in technology shocks was much higher than in non-
technology shocks. In fact, the sectoral non-technology shocks shared
their ﬁrst principal component with the macroeconomic demand shock.
Non-technology shocks are quite uniform for the macro-economic and
the sectoral level.
3. There is only a weak association between macro-economic and sectoral
technology shocks in manufacturing industries. This supports the view
that the development of labor productivity follows a “mushroom” pat-
tern, as found by Harberger [18] for the US industries and Peneder [25]
for Austria and other EU countries.
The eﬀects of technology and non-technology shocks to indicators of
growth conﬁrmed the interferences form impulse response analysis. There is
a strong relationship of non-technology shocks with employment and output
13growth and a very weak relationship with investment growth. The ﬁndings
for technology shocks however, showed marked diﬀerences for the manufac-
turing industries and the aggregate economy. We did not ﬁnd the a negative
eﬀect on employment growth by technology shocks.
The main policy conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis are
twofold. Based on the the ﬁnding that hours worked are negatively asso-
ciated to technology shocks in almost all manufacturing sectors (and to a
lesser extent at the aggregate level) it follows that if this is not compensated
by demand growth sectoral employment tends to shrink. This suggests that
on the one hand increasing the sectoral mobility of the workforce should be
an important policy goal to avoid unemployment. On the other hand, if
other sectors cannot compensate the negative eﬀects of technological change
on employment then reductions of working hours is probably a feasible so-
lution. In fact, during the period we studied the reduction in working hours
together with the expansion of employment in non-manufacturing sectors
can explain the aggregate result that the negative response of hours worked
to technology shocks did not translate into negative eﬀects on employment
growth. Supply side policy measures such as technology policies oriented
towards product innovations may be able to oﬀset the need to reduce work-
ing hours, as competition in product variety reduces the pressure to increase
labor productivity and demand saturation is avoided. But a detailed discus-
sion of this is beyond the scope of this paper. Even more so as our results
suggest that further research needs to take into account the service sector.
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16A Data appendix
Table 11 lists the industries used in the empirical research. Industries 8 and
9, the ﬁlm industry and sawmills were excluded due to incomplete data.
(Tables 11 and 12 about here)
A.1 The extraction of working hours
Statistik Austria does not provide data on hours worked for the industries.
However they provide indices of productivity per hour worked for the indus-
tries. An index of hours worked can be obtained from this index by using the
index of physical production. As real labor productivity per hour is deﬁned
as α =
Y
H, where Y is real output and H is total hours, total hours can be
obtained by H =
Y
α, where Y is the index of production. An index of hours
per worker can also be obtained in a similar fashion.
A.2 Industry speciﬁc deﬂators
As the Austrian statistical oﬃce does not provide data on real produc-
tion values or speciﬁc output-deﬂators, the indices of physical production
and nominal production values were used to calculate the desired industry-
speciﬁc deﬂators. The current value of production for the quantity produced
in 1995 was calculated for each year by multiplying the nominal produc-
tion with the index of production (100 = 1995). Industry-speciﬁc output-
deﬂators were then obtained by dividing the current value of the quantity
produced in 1995 by the nominal production value in 1995.
17B Tables in text
Table 1: Hall-Evans-tests
technology shocks non-technology shocks
Correlation Granger Causality Correlation Granger Causality
r2 F-test p-value r2 F-test p-value r2 F-test p-value r2 F-test p-value
1 0.04 0.27 0.85 0.08 0.23 0.96 0.13 0.95 0.44 0.22 0.76 0.61
2 0.06 0.40 0.75 0.22 0.77 0.60 0.09 0.62 0.61 0.25 0.91 0.51
3 0.17 1.33 0.29 0.40 1.81 0.16 0.05 0.31 0.81 0.51 2.82 0.05
4 0.20 1.57 0.23 0.20 0.67 0.68 0.06 0.40 0.76 0.31 1.22 0.35
5 0.13 0.92 0.45 0.36 1.47 0.25 0.04 0.27 0.85 0.53 3.07 0.03
6 0.05 0.34 0.80 0.20 0.66 0.68 0.11 0.78 0.52 0.46 2.31 0.08
7 0.23 1.91 0.16 0.34 1.38 0.28 0.25 2.15 0.13 0.62 4.30 0.01
10 0.16 1.18 0.35 0.34 1.37 0.29 0.03 0.21 0.89 0.42 1.91 0.14
11 0.20 1.54 0.24 0.28 1.03 0.44 0.33 3.07 0.05 0.48 2.46 0.07
12 0.19 1.50 0.25 0.32 1.24 0.34 0.24 2.00 0.15 0.51 2.72 0.05
13 0.04 0.23 0.87 0.29 1.11 0.40 0.17 1.26 0.32 0.22 0.74 0.62
14 0.11 0.77 0.52 0.31 1.22 0.35 0.06 0.37 0.77 0.32 1.24 0.34
15 0.06 0.41 0.75 0.41 1.82 0.16 0.04 0.30 0.83 0.32 1.24 0.34
16 0.11 0.77 0.52 0.19 0.63 0.70 0.04 0.28 0.84 0.62 4.28 0.01
17 0.10 0.69 0.57 0.11 0.33 0.91 0.07 0.50 0.69 0.35 1.44 0.26
18 0.16 1.21 0.33 0.20 0.67 0.67 0.03 0.16 0.92 0.34 1.34 0.30
19 0.05 0.31 0.82 0.46 2.27 0.09 0.03 0.22 0.88 0.25 0.91 0.51
20 0.12 0.88 0.47 0.17 0.54 0.77 0.09 0.63 0.60 0.43 2.05 0.12
21 0.17 1.32 0.30 0.11 0.34 0.91 0.04 0.28 0.84 0.33 1.29 0.32
MS 0.11 0.78 0.52 0.13 0.39 0.88 0.11 0.78 0.52 0.32 1.24 0.34
18Table 2: Proportion of variance accounted for by component ci in
sectoral technology shocks (TS) by principal component (squared
correlation [r(ci,σi)]2). Sectors and macro-shock. Legend: (EV)
eigenvalue, (ExV) explained Variance, (Cum) cumulated ExV, (Prop.Var)
Proportion of variance explained by bold marked components, numbers in
ﬁrst column give the industry IDs, MS the macro shock. All components
with EV ≥ 1.
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 Prop. Var.
EV 4.34 3.32 1.88 1.84 1.41 1.30 1.10 1.01
ExV 21.69% 16.60% 9.39% 9.18% 7.04% 6.51% 5.50% 5.04%
Cum 21.69% 38.29% 47.68% 56.86% 63.90% 70.41% 75.91% 80.95%
1 0.0917 0.0260 0.1987 0.1802 0.0000 0.1100 0.0366 0.0688 0.4888
2 0.0084 0.0103 0.3114 0.4003 0.0182 0.0141 0.0226 0.0023 0.7118
3 0.4263 0.0957 0.0466 0.0600 0.0307 0.0004 0.1982 0.0012 0.6245
4 0.3964 0.0363 0.1108 0.0322 0.0604 0.1234 0.0196 0.0399 0.6305
5 0.0639 0.4330 0.1985 0.0505 0.0099 0.0054 0.0613 0.0007 0.6315
6 0.2353 0.0111 0.0364 0.2595 0.2286 0.0453 0.0000 0.0000 0.7234
7 0.0560 0.0105 0.3143 0.2591 0.1432 0.0739 0.0182 0.0337 0.7166
10 0.3143 0.0224 0.0050 0.0151 0.0031 0.0408 0.0038 0.0641 0.3143
11 0.3533 0.1757 0.0725 0.1031 0.0085 0.1089 0.0196 0.0342 0.7410
12 0.3440 0.1553 0.1008 0.0310 0.1763 0.0259 0.0572 0.0209 0.7764
13 0.2032 0.2905 0.0041 0.0022 0.2425 0.0044 0.0192 0.0490 0.7362
14 0.0150 0.4984 0.0120 0.0057 0.0357 0.0721 0.1137 0.0319 0.6121
15 0.0481 0.2662 0.0003 0.0409 0.0433 0.0634 0.0560 0.3440 0.6103
16 0.1837 0.2239 0.0203 0.0028 0.0067 0.1564 0.2189 0.0050 0.6103
17 0.0001 0.2778 0.1315 0.2053 0.0028 0.0656 0.1510 0.0158 0.7828
18 0.2249 0.3147 0.0130 0.0574 0.2403 0.0048 0.0393 0.0030 0.7799
19 0.2909 0.0282 0.1346 0.1074 0.0833 0.2189 0.0385 0.0007 0.7518
20 0.6045 0.0418 0.0010 0.0226 0.0548 0.0890 0.0061 0.0002 0.6935
21 0.4658 0.0980 0.0159 0.0000 0.0082 0.0480 0.0020 0.0022 0.5638
MS 0.0114 0.3046 0.1504 0.0009 0.0109 0.0316 0.0192 0.2896 0.7446
Table 3: Proportion of variance accounted for by component ci in
sectoral demand shocks (DS) by principal component. Sectors and
macro-shock. All components with EV ≥ 1.
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 Prop. Var.
EV 9.03 2.31 1.45 1.26 1.14 1.03
ExV 45.16% 11.57% 7.25% 6.29% 5.68% 5.16%
Cum 45.16% 56.73% 63.98% 70.27% 75.95% 81.11%
1 0.0843 0.5938 0.0204 0.0172 0.0317 0.1019 0.6957
2 0.0052 0.2900 0.4251 0.0025 0.0803 0.0422 0.7151
3 0.4274 0.2006 0.0174 0.0320 0.0771 0.0125 0.6280
4 0.6952 0.0064 0.0047 0.0055 0.0686 0.0265 0.6952
5 0.6951 0.0146 0.0325 0.0322 0.0242 0.0151 0.6951
6 0.5550 0.1401 0.0303 0.0000 0.0007 0.0007 0.6951
7 0.5713 0.0304 0.0277 0.1271 0.0361 0.1077 0.8061
10 0.4663 0.0113 0.0019 0.0005 0.0250 0.3214 0.7877
11 0.4937 0.0546 0.0035 0.1236 0.1226 0.0634 0.7400
12 0.1076 0.1384 0.0916 0.1757 0.0089 0.1453 0.5670
13 0.0080 0.3029 0.4119 0.0064 0.0229 0.0221 0.7148
14 0.3675 0.1489 0.0213 0.1542 0.0505 0.0947 0.6706
15 0.4565 0.0156 0.0245 0.3216 0.0483 0.0069 0.7781
16 0.5524 0.0064 0.0009 0.0222 0.1389 0.0293 0.6913
17 0.5562 0.0014 0.0520 0.0406 0.0929 0.0050 0.5562
18 0.8080 0.0517 0.0022 0.0102 0.0350 0.0005 0.8080
19 0.6516 0.0076 0.0008 0.0509 0.0313 0.0296 0.6515
20 0.8472 0.0149 0.0524 0.0006 0.0028 0.0005 0.8472
21 0.3268 0.2721 0.0230 0.1216 0.0268 0.0061 0.7206
MS 0.3566 0.0122 0.2053 0.0131 0.2114 0.0006 0.7733
19Table 4: Employment growth and technology and non-technology shocks at
the level of manufacturing industries: 1976-1995
Manufacturing Capital goods Intermediate goods Consumer goods
sector sector sector sector
tst -0.013 -0.009 -0.012 -0.017
[7.89]*** [3.23]*** [5.48]*** [4.77]***
tst−1 -0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.004
[1.67]* [0.38] [2.45]** [1.03]
tst−2 0 0.003 0 0.001
[0.18] [1.01] [0.09] [0.14]
dst 0.022 0.022 0.021 0.025
[14.25]*** [8.34]*** [10.39]*** [7.00]***
dst−1 0.015 0.017 0.011 0.017
[9.75]*** [6.78]*** [5.53]*** [4.80]***
dst−2 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.005
[2.71]*** [2.03]** [0.76] [1.53]
Observations 380 120 120 120
industries 19 6 6 6
r
2 0.51 0.54 0.63 0.49
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at
1%; industry speciﬁc intercepts not reported.
Table 5: Economic growth and technology and non-technology shocks at the
macroeconomic level
Employment growth gdp growth Investment growth
tst 0.003 0.012 0.035
[1.71] [5.33]*** [1.24]
tst−1 0.003 0.005 0.015
[1.67] [1.95]* [0.72]
tst−2 0.002 -0.001 -0.014
[0.89] [0.44] [0.74]
dst 0.004 0.012 0.023
[2.19]** [5.28]*** [1.14]
dst−1 0.001 -0.006 -0.017
[0.66] [3.09]*** [0.73]
dst−2 0.001 0.001 0.006
[0.55] [0.33] [0.35]
Observations 21 21 19
years 1975 − 95 1975 − 95 1977-1995
r
2 0.36 0.84 0.34
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
20Table 6: The growth of output and technology and non-technology shocks
at the level of manufacturing industries: 1976-1995
Manufacturing Capital goods Intermediate goods Consumer goods
sector sector sector sector
tst 0.002 0.02 -0.011 -0.002
[0.62] [4.40]*** [1.90]* [0.34]
tst−1 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.007
[0.61] [1.38] [0.13] [1.41]
tst−2 0.003 0.004 0.001 0
[1.05] [0.95] [0.12] [0.06]
dst 0.041 0.061 0.024 0.029
[14.09]*** [13.79]*** [4.42]*** [6.18]***
dst−1 0 0.002 -0.005 0.005
[0.06] [0.38] [0.99] [0.99]
dst−2 0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.001
years [0.18] [0.56] [0.10] [0.17]
Observations 380 120 120 120
industries 19 6 6 6
r
2 0.37 0.68 0.2 0.29
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at
1%; industry speciﬁc intercepts not reported.
Table 7: The growth of investment in machinery and technology and non-
technology shocks at the level of manufacturing industries: 1976-1995
Manufacturing Capital goods Intermediate goods Consumer goods
sector sector sector sector
tst -0.04 -0.055 -0.017 -0.05
[2.26]** [1.63] [0.48] [2.04]**
tst−1 -0.012 -0.056 -0.009 0.005
[0.72] [1.76]* [0.25] [0.21]
tst−2 0.03 0.037 0.052 0.015
[1.76]* [1.17] [1.53] [0.62]
dst 0.047 0.049 0.058 0.043
[2.71]*** [1.52] [1.72]* [1.76]*
dst−1 0.031 0.041 0.043 0.038
[1.82]* [1.34] [1.26] [1.57]
dst−2 -0.002 0.076 -0.013 -0.041
[0.10] [2.26]** [0.38] [1.67]*
Observations 380 120 120 120
industries 19 6 6 6
r
2 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.11
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at
1%; industry speciﬁc intercepts not reported.
21Table 8: Non-technology shocks and the growth of investment in machinery
at the level of manufacturing industries: 1975-1995
Manufacturing Capital goods Intermediate goods Consumer goods
sector sector sector sector
invt 0.435 -0.005 0.567 0.835
[2.88]*** [0.02] [2.22]** [2.41]**
invt−1 0.114 -0.259 0.394 0.13
[0.75] [1.09] [1.54] [0.37]
invt−2 0.065 -0.438 0.217 0.356
[0.42] [1.75]* [0.85] [1.09]
Observations 418 132 132 132
industries 19 6 6 6
r
2 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at
1%; industry speciﬁc intercepts not reported.
Table 9: Technology shocks and the growth of investment in machinery at
the level of manufacturing industries: 1975-1995
Manufacturing Capital goods Intermediate goods Consumer goods
sector sector sector sector
invt -0.366 -0.462 -0.1 -0.929
[2.43]** [1.94]* [0.39] [2.70]***
invt−1 -0.078 0.16 -0.028 -0.706
[0.52] [0.69] [0.11] [2.04]**
invt−2 0.14 -0.014 0.39 0.008
[0.93] [0.06] [1.53] [0.02]
Observations 418 132 132 132
industries 19 6 6 6
r
2 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.07
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at
1%; industry speciﬁc intercepts not reported.
Table 10: Technology shocks and non-technology shocks and demand shocks
at the macroeconomic level: 1979-1995
Technology shock Technology shock Non-technology shock Non-technology shock
invt 4.536 3.969
[1.15] [1.01]
invt−1 0.052 0.569 -0.061 0.391
[0.02] [0.17] [0.02] [0.12]
invt−2 3.136 1.784 1.119 -0.065
[0.92] [0.55] [0.33] [0.02]
Observations 17 17 17 17
R-squared 0.11 0.02 0.07 0
Notes: Absolute value of t statistics in brackets; * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
22Table 11: List of industries
KS Industry (German) Industry (English)
1 Bergwerke mining
2 Erd¨ ol oil and reﬁnery
3 Stein-Keramik stone and ceramics
4 Glas glass and glass products
5 Chemie chemical industries
6 Papiererzeugung manufacture of pulp and paper
7 Papierverarbeitung paper processing
10 Holzverarbeitung wood processing
11 Nahrungs- und Genussmittel food and tobacco
12 Ledererzeugung leather producing
13 Lederverarbeitung leather processing
14 Giesserei foundries
15 NE-Metall metal industry except steel
16 Maschinen-Stahlbau machinery and steel constructions
17 KFZ transportation equipment
18 Eisen-Metal iron and metal products
19 Elektroindustrie electrical equipment, appliances and
components
20 Textilindustrie textiles except clothing
21 Bekleidungsindustrie clothing
Table 12: Industry grouping
Code Description Industries (KS)
1 capital goods industries 14,15,16,17,18,19
2 intermediate goods industries 2,3,4,5,6,7
3 consumer goods industries 10,11,12,13,20,21
23C Figures in text
Figure 1: Aggregate impulse responses for the entire economy. The response of hours worked to technology shocks is weak
and near zero.
2
4Figure 2: Impulse response for the metal industry (except steel) (ID 15). The impulse response patterns shown for this
industry are representative for most other industries. Technology shocks have a negative long run impact on hours worked.
2
5Figure 3: Impulse response for machinery and steel construction (ID16). Together with the machinery and steel constructions
industry (ID16) the impulse response patterns correspond to “pathological” cases, where technology shocks have a positive
long run impact on hours worked.
2
6D The extraction of technology and non-
technology shocks from the VAR residuals
As the VMA(∞) process in equation (1) contains non-observable
technology and non-technology shock parameters, it is necessary
to rewrite it as an VAR(1) process (omitting the subscript i
identifying each sector) of the form
ˆ yt = Ψˆ yt−1 + et = ΨLˆ yt + et
= (I − ΨL)−1et. (3)
Here the et’s are the reduced form shocks. They are linear com-
binations of technology and non-technology (demand) shocks σdt
and σst in equation (1). The inverse (I − ΨL)−1 represents
the estimated accumulated responses to the observed shocks, as
(I − ΨL)−1 ≈ I + ΨL + (ΨL)2 + ... + (ΨL)n, with n → ∞.4
Taking out the lag operator we can rewrite equation (3) as:
ˆ yt = Iet + Ψet−1 + Ψ2et−2 + .... + Ψnet−n. (4)
Comparing the ﬁrst terms in equations (1) and (4) we get by
deﬁnition Iet = Φ0σt, which leads to equation (2). It gives us
the shocks from the residuals of the VAR.
The multiplier matrix Φ0 is extracted from the VAR(1) ma-
trix Ψ through the following decomposition. Due to the or-
thonormality imposed on the shocks σst and σdt it must be that
Cov(ee’) = Φ0Φ0
0. (5)
We call this covariance matrix Σ = Φ0Φ0
0. Comparing equations
(1) and (4) and by recalling equation (2) we can say that
Φ1Lσt = ΨLet → Φ1Lσt = ΨΦ0Lσt → Ψ = Φ1Φ−1
0
and in general for any lag
Ψ` = Φ`Φ−1
0 .








For easier handling we may introduce the following deﬁnitions:
∞ X
`=0




4The matrix (I − ΨL) is of course non-singular, i.e. (I − ΨL)(I − ΨL)
−1 = I




C(1) = R(1)Φ0. (7)
As R(1) and Σ from equation (5) are known, it is possible to
ﬁnd C(1) by post-multiplying the left part of (7) with its inverse
R(1)Φ0Φ0
0R(1)0 = R(1)ΣR(1)0 = C(1)C(1)0.
Due to the restriction that non-technology shocks do not aﬀect
long run productivity growth,
P∞
`=0 Φ`(1,2) = C(1)12 = 0 we
can carry out a lower triangular Choleski decomposition to get
C(1). By plugging this result back into equation (7) and ﬁnding
the solution to R(1)−1C(1), the matrix of long run multipliers
of the exogenous shocks Φ0 results. The multiplication of the
inverse of this matrix with the series of residuals from the esti-
mation of (3) as shown in equation (2) gives then the series of
technology and non-technology shocks. The factorization pro-
cedure described in this appendix is implemented in the Eviews
and STATA packages, which we used both to derive our results.
28E Additional ﬁgures: Impulse response func-
tions for all industries
Figure 4: Impulse response functions industries 1-4.
2
9Figure 5: Impulse response functions industries 5,6,7 and 10.
3
0Figure 6: Impulse response functions industries 11-14.
3
1Figure 7: Impulse response functions industries 15-18.
3
2Figure 8: Impulse response functions industries 19, 20, 21 and aggregated shocks.
3
3